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This paper examines two qualitative rules of thumb, frequently invoked in discussions of
bank regulatory policy. The first, that equity holders prefer more risk to less, derives from
a result in option pricing theory, that an option’s value increases monotonically with the
riskiness of the underlying asset. This result is shown to depend on very restrictive
assumptions regarding the underlying assets return distribution and the type of option
being considered. These restrictive assumptions do not generally obtain in practice. The
second rule of thumb is that bondholders’ and deposit insurers’ interests are aligned. The
paper shows that, in fact, their interests can diverge in the sense that bondholders and
deposit insurers will not necessarily agree on the relative riskiness of different banks or
bank portfolios. The conclusion of this paper is that rules of thumb can be misleading.
Furthermore, the concept of risk is shown to be model and agent specific.
The author thanks Ravi Jagannathan, David Marshall, Ehud Ronn, and Kuldeep Shastri
for helpful discussions. Any remaining errors are my own.
The analysis and conclusions expressed herein represent the author’s personal opinion,
which do not necessarily coincide with those of the Federal Reserve System or the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.“…, standard option pricing theory suggests that, all else being equal, the value
of equity increases with the risk of a banking organization’s assets.” (Kwast et al., 1999)
“…the incentives of the subordinated debt holders and the deposit insurance
agency are aligned.” (Kaufman et al., 2000).
1.  Introduction
Financial models are useful for understanding the relation among economic
factors, for instance risk and return. Models are, however, based on simplifying
assumptions, and the qualitative relations that we infer from these models do not always
hold when the assumptions are violated. Similarly, intuitions based on simple conceptual
frameworks may not be valid under more complex circumstances.
This paper will examine two commonly rules of thumb that arise from such
simple models. The first is the hypothesis that option value increases in the risk of the
underlying asset. The second is that fixed claimants of a firm, sharing common attitudes
towards risk, will agree in their assessments.
Empirical option pricing models, used to fit option prices, are susceptible to
testing. However, the hypothesis that option value increases monotonically with risk is a
qualitative assertion that is not generally tested. When the option-value/risk relation is
combined with the idea that equity holders of a firm have an option-like claim, it leads to
the conclusion the equity holders prefer more risk to less. It may be argued that, given the
chance, equity holders will expropriate other creditors by undertaking more risky projects
once the return on debt has been locked in. This asset substitution moral hazard problem
is considered to be particularly severe when the cost of debt is insensitive to risk or is
underpriced as happens with deposit insurance.
The second section of this paper examines the option-value/risk monotonicity
hypothesis from a number of perspectives. It is shown that, in general, the hypothesis that
option value increases in risk requires that the underlying asset values have a simple two-
parameter distribution—for example, lognormal. When comparing options on two
different assets both underlying distributions must come from the same two-parameter
family for the hypothesis to be true. Two-parameter distributions work in this context
because variance can be unambiguously equated with risk, and higher moments are fixed2
functions of the first and second moments of the distribution. For arbitrary distributions,
however, the concept of risk is ambiguous. A simple numerical example shows that
variance does not necessarily provide a reliable ordering of option values. Indeed, in
cases where the ordering of the values of two options varies with the strike price, then no
measure of risk can possibly exist that satisfies the monotonicity hypothesis. Even under
simple two-parameter distributions the option-value/risk relation depends on the type of
option involved. Several cases applicable to the equity holder incentive question are
discussed in the same section.
The hypothesis that all fixed claimants share common attitudes towards risk does
not appear to arise from a specific model of required returns for providers of capital.
Rather, it is based on intuition. Ceteris paribus, an increase in asset risk seems likely to
increase the risk for all fixed claimants. This statement is, however, ambiguous: asset risk
is undefined, as are the risks are claimants concerned with. Claimants may be concerned
with the probability of default, if default per se triggers non-economic consequences. Or
they may be interested in purely economic losses, in which case expected loss rather than
default is the relevant measure of risk. Asset risk might be measured with variance, but
again if all underlying distributions are not from the same two-parameter family similar-
variance portfolios of assets can present different risks to different creditors.
The third section of this develops a rational model of bond pricing under the
assumption that bondholders are risk-neutral, deposits have a senior claim on the assets of
the bank, and that deposit insurers bear any losses if the bank cannot repay depositors in
full.
1 The method of analysis utilizes comparisons of pairs of asset distributions,
representing alternative investments a bank might make, holding capital structure fixed.
The model shows that bondholders do not always price bonds so that higher coupons
correspond to higher bond- or deposit-default risk. While higher coupons correspond (by
construction) to higher expected bondholder losses, it is not true that they necessarily
correspond to higher deposit insurer losses.
                                                
1 Deposit insurance pricing is not considered. This is consistent with current U.S. practice where deposit
insurance is minimally risk sensitive and is arguably under-priced. However, the qualitative results of this
analysis are not dependent on this assumption.3
The conclusion of this paper is that qualitative results from simple models and
intuitions are apt to break down is more complex and realistic situations. In particular, the
idea of risk turns out to be complex, and agent and model specific. The usual practice of
identifying risk with variance works only in restrictive situations. In general, a single
measure of risk consistent across models and agents will not exist.
2. The Monotonicity of the Option-Value/Risk Relation
Every introductory Investments text teaches that the value of an option increases
monotonically as the risk of the underlying asset increases.
2 This relation is widely
assumed to be true among academics and practitioners. The hypothesis appears in the real
options approach to capital budgeting.
3 In the literature on bank capital regulation, the
monotonicity hypothesis leads to a moral hazard argument that since riskier investments
benefit a bank’s equity holders, banks have incentives for excessive risk taking at the
expense of the bondholders and deposit insurers.
The monotonicity hypothesis is based on the models of Black-Scholes (1972) and
Merton (1973). Within the context of the models and options studied in these papers the
relation does indeed hold true. Outside this context, the hypothesis is not necessarily or
even generally true.
Literature Review of Sufficient Conditions
A number of papers have established sufficient conditions under which the
monotonicity hypothesis will hold. All of these paper considered only fixed-expiry, plain-
vanilla European put and call options. Black-Scholes (1972) and Merton (1973) assume
that the underlying asset follows a log-normal diffusion process:
(,)
dS
dt S t dz
S
ασ =+
and pays no dividends. In the Black-Scholes model, the volatility term is constant,
                                                
2 It is common practice to identify the underlying asset’s “risk” with the volatility or variance of the
underlying stochastic process or the variance of the distribution of asset values at the time of option
expiration.
3 See for example Dixit and Pyndyck (1994), p. 153.4
(,) . St σσ =  In the Merton model the volatility term can vary as a deterministic function
of time,  (,) ( ) . St t σσ =  Bergman, Grundy and Weiner (1996) show that the monotonicity
hypothesis holds for the general class of univariate diffusion processes even if volatility
depends on the level of the underlying asset as long as  *( , ) ( , ) , st st st σσ ≥∀ and
*( , ) ( , ) st st σσ >  for some s and t. Changing the distributional assumptions, the payout
assumptions, or the types options considered can change the relation between risk and
option value.
Jagannathan (1984) does not rely on the Black-Scholes-Merton framework based
on assumptions of the underlying stochastic process. Jagannathan instead uses the
Harrison and Kreps (1979) risk-neutral pricing framework. He shows in a two-period
context that if terminal-value distributions of two underlying assets differ in risk in the
Rothschild-Stigitz (1970) sense of mean-preserving spreads, then otherwise similar
options on the riskier asset will be more valuable. Jagannathan thus proves that
Rothschild-Stiglitz risk ordering is a sufficient condition for the monotonicity hypothesis
to obtain, but does not address necessary conditions. However, the Rothschild-Stiglitz
definition of risk is very restrictive. In general, two distributions will not differ by mean-
preserving spreads, and thus cannot be ranked on the basis of their “risk” in the
Rothschild-Stiglitz sense.
Each of these papers establishes sufficient conditions under which the
monotonicity hypothesis will be true. That is not to say however that these conditions
obtain in general. No paper of which I am aware has proposed necessary conditions that
must obtain if the monotonicity hypothesis is to be true. In the following analysis an
alternative approach is taken to the problem. I answer the question “If the monotonicity
hypothesis is true, what must be true of asset distributions?”
Distribution-based analysis with European options
The conclusion that the higher the underlying asset’s risk the higher the resulting
(European) option value can lead to a potentially untenable conclusion. First we need to
be specific about the claim. When comparing options on two underlying assets, the5
moneynesses, times to expiry, and types of option must be equivalent.
4 With this proviso,
let us state the monotonicity hypothesis as:
** * Risk( ) Risk( ) ( ; , ) ( ; , ) T T Tt Tt S S CS KS CS KS K ≤⇒ ≤ ∀ (1)
where K is the common strike price, t and T are the current time and option expiry
respectively, and  t S  and 
*
t S  are the current values of the two underlying assets, 
*, tt SS =
and  T S  and 
*
T S  are the (random) values of the two underlying assets at the expiration of
the option. “Risk” is, for the moment, undefined.
Let us assume for sake of argument that the monotonicity hypothesis is true. It
then follows that the reverse of equation (1) also holds
** * Risk( ) Risk( ) ( ; , ) ( ; , ) T T Tt Tt S S CS KS CS KS K ≥⇒ ≥ ∀
which in turn implies that
** * Risk( ) Risk( ) ( ; , ) ( ; , ) . T T Tt Tt S S CS KS CS KS K =⇔ = ∀ (2)
Under the monotonicity assumption, equation (1), equation (2) must hold for all
strikes, K.
5 Using the Cox-Ross (1976) option-pricing framework: the value of an option
is the discounted expected payoff under the risk-neutral distribution of the value of the
underlying asset at option expiration. For a call option this means
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where  () f ⋅ and  *() f ⋅ are risk neutral density functions for the terminal, time-T, value of
. T S  To guarantee that  () f ⋅ and *() f ⋅  are proper distributions
                                                
4 Obviously a deep in-the-money option will be worth more than a deep out-of-the-money option on a
slightly riskier underlying asset. Equivalence is most easily achieved by considering similar-strike call (or
put) options on underlying assets that currently have the same value (achievable in practice by scaling—i.e.
adjusting the contract quantity).
5 An important implication of the monotonicity hypothesis is that
** **
(;,) (;,)  f o r  s o m e   (;,) (;,) .
Tt Tt Tt Tt CS KS CS KS K CS KS CS KS K >⇒ ≥ ∀
In other words, option value ordering cannot be strike-dependent.6
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to ensure that the drifts under the risk-neutral distribution equal the risk-free rate, r.
Suppose 
* Risk( ) Risk( ), TT SS =  for some candidate measure of risk, for example
variance. Under the monotonicity hypothesis this would imply that
** (;,) (;,) . Tt Tt CS KS CS KS K =∀  Thus
* () ( ) () ( ) .
KK
x K f x dx x K f x dx K
∞∞
−= − ∀ ∫∫ (3)
Following Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) and differentiating equation (3) twice with
respect to K results in
* () () . fK f K K =∀
In other words, if greater “risk” is invariably associated with greater option value
(subject to the above caveats), this implies that equal risk implies equal option value,
which in turn implies that the two underlying-asset-value risk-neutral distributions must
be identical whenever two similar-strike options have the same value (on two underlying
assets that have the same current value). Necessary conditions therefore for the
monotonicity hypothesis to be true are that all distributions can be ordered in terms of an
appropriate measure of risk (for valuing options) and that distributions of equal risk be
exactly identical.
This condition is naturally met whenever both underlying asset distributions come
from the same two-parameter parametric distribution, as for instance is assumed in the7
Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing framework. Within a given two-parameter family
of distributions, the higher moments are fixed functions of the mean and variance so that
“risk” may be unambiguously measured by variance. If, however,
1.  The two underlying assets come from different two-parameter parametric
distributions, say one is normally distributed and the other is log-normally
distributed, it will not necessarily be the case that equal risk will result in
equal option prices for all strikes, even though both parameters are tied down.
2.  If higher moments are priced variance is no longer a sufficient statistic for
risk.
3.  If the two underlying asset distributions come from the same parametric
family having more than two parameters, then it is possible for drift (expected
value of the underlying) and variance to be the same while allowing the
distributions to differ in their higher moments resulting in different option
prices for the same variance.
4.  If the underlying asset distributions are non-parametric, equal variance
combined with equal means are insufficient to guarantee equal option values.
Thus, defining risk as variance or volatility works only in limited cases, and in
those cases where variance is not an unambiguous measure of risk, variance
does not provide the hypothesized ordering of option values.
None of these conditions are impossible. Indeed they are quite likely to occur in
the real world. It is thus almost certain that the necessary conditions for the monotonicity
hypothesis to obtain do not in general obtain. This is not to say that there do not exist
some special classes of underlying assets for which the monotonicity hypothesis is true.
However, that is an empirical question.
It is possible to construct counter-examples to the monotonicity hypothesis in a
Harrison-Kreps no-arbitrage pricing framework—examples where the relative ordering of
option values depends on the strike price.
6 Consider the following example:
Let the risk-free rate be 5 percent. Two assets, A and B, both have current values
of 1. Each asset has three equally likely end-of-period values as follows:
                                                
6 Jaganathan (1984) also presents a counter-example using discrete asset payoffs. His example relies on
state-contingent utility of payoffs. The example given here does not.8
Example 1
Payoffs
State High Medium Low
2 σ C(K=1) C(K=2)
Probability 1/3 1/3 1/3
Asset A 2.041 0.559 0.500 0.491 0.330 0.013
Asset B 2.020 1.130 0.000 0.683 0.365 0.006
The expected payoff of each asset is 1.05, consistent with risk-neutral pricing.
7 The
variance of A is 0.491 and that of B is 0.683. Under the monotonicity hypothesis an
option on A should always be worth less than a similar-strike option on B. A call option
on A with a strike price of 1 has a value of 0.330, while a similar call option on B has a
(higher) value of 0.365, as expected. However, a call option with a strike price of 2 on A
has a value of 0.013, while a similar call option on B has a (lower) value of 0.006. Thus,
for this distribution of payoffs, the monotonicity hypothesis does not hold.
If one attempts to risk as the property that results in ordering of option values, it
will not be possible to assign “risk” ordering to most arbitrary pairs of distributions. As
the above example shows it is easy to find option pairs where order changes with the
strike price leading to the conclusions that no monotonicity hypothesis-consistent
measure of risk exists in these cases. Unlike the Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preserve spread
definition of risk, variance can always be used to order underlying distributions (those
with finite variance) in terms of that measure of risk, but cannot always order the values
of options on those distributions of payoffs. Variance as a measure of risk is relevant for
the monotonicity hypothesis only in very restrictive situations.
Unless one is willing to assume that all underlying asset distributions come from
the same two-parameter parametric family or that all underlying asset distributions differ
by mean-preserving spreads, both clearly counter-factual assumptions, one cannot
conclude that higher “risk,” variance or volatility invariably implies higher European
                                                
7 A risk-free bond that pays off 1.05 in each state has the required present value of 1.9
option value. Thus, the monotonicity hypothesis is not invariably true and is most
probably not even generally true.
Different kinds of options and underlying payoffs
The monotonicity hypothesis does not invariably hold, even under the Black-
Scholes-Merton log-normal diffusion assumption, for all types of options or underlying
payoff streams. When applied to pricing down-and-out barrier options the Black-Scholes-
Merton analysis produces a complex relation between option value and volatility. For
barrier options close to the barrier, an increase in volatility decreases the value of the
option. For a barrier option deeper into the money, option value will increase as volatility
increases from zero, but only up to a point, beyond which further increases in volatility
again lead to a decline in the value of the option. Merton (1978) found a similar effect
modeling the value of equity as a perpetual call option on the value of the firm with the
firm was subject to random audits. If an audit finds that the value of the firm had declined
below the value of debt, the firm is liquidated on the spot. This is an intermediate case
between the European option and the barrier option. Merton found that as the value of the
firm declined towards the value of debt, equity holders became less risk tolerant (value of
equity varied inversely with risk). However, for firms with plenty of economic equity the
positive equity-value/asset-risk relation obtained, but only up to a point. If perchance the
value of the firm declined below the value of debt before an audit, equity holders become
extremely risk seeking in an effort to regain positive equity prior to the next audit.
Ritchken, Thomson, DeGennaro and Li (1993) modeling bank equity as a call
option added charter value that would be lost in the event insolvency resulting in a
negative payoff to the equity holder rather than the equity call option simply expiring
worthless. Ritchken et al also permitted the equity holder to dynamically manage firm
risk. Their finding was that as the firm approaches insolvency equity holders will
decrease risk. This is consistent with the non-monotone relation between risk and option
value found in the barrier option framework. Thus, even under restrictive distributional
assumptions the monotonicity hypothesis is not true except for a subset of types of
options.10
Geske and Shastri (1981) examined American options with uncertain
(suspendable) discrete dividends. They show that that in this case the relation between
option value and underlying asset risk is not always monotonically increasing.
Summary
The monotonicity hypothesis is a qualitative result that arose from early
investigations into the determinants of options prices. These early investigations were
made in the context of a specific model (log-normal diffusion) and option type (European
puts and calls) where the hypothesis happened to be true. In addition to the original
Black-Scholes  (1972) and Merton (1973) studies, two previous studies have examined
examples of sufficient distributional assumptions under which the hypothesis, applied to
European puts and calls, obtains. This note has derived distributional implications of the
monotonicity hypothesis that constitute necessary conditions for the hypothesis to obtain.
I have shown that in general the hypothesis leads to implausible restrictions on the
possible distribution of stochastic generating process and asset terminal value
distributions.
An alternative indictment of the monotonicity hypothesis can and has been made
by considering alternative options types rather than distributional assumptions. Numerous
papers have noted the complexities of risk/option value relations, even in the context of
log-normal diffusion processes. Unfortunately these papers are frequently forgotten when
the monotonicity hypothesis is invoked, for instance in valuing real options or assessing
equity holder moral hazard incentives.
8
The cases where the monotonicity hypothesis obtains unambiguously are really
rather specialized. Few contingent claims, other than some traded options, are simple
European puts and calls on non-dividend paying underlying assets. As Merton himself
admits, log-normality is a crude approximation of stock return distributions (Merton,
1990, p. 59). For other assets, for instance loan portfolios with their bounded returns, the
                                                
8 Geske and Shastri (1981) and Bergman, Grundy and Weiner (1996) study other commonly held beliefs: 1)
that option values increase monotonically with the value of the underlying asset; 2) that option values
increase monotonically with the time to expiry; 3) that option values are convex functions of the value of
the underlying. All of these hypotheses can be violated when one moves away from the Black-Scholes-
Merton framework.11
assumption is clearly untenable. Most corporate budgeting, regulatory and risk
management problems are multi-period with boundary conditions, uncertain intermediate
payouts and the potential for adaptive adjustments of portfolio characteristics.
The monotonicity hypothesis cannot be take for granted. Whether it applies in a
particular situation is an empirical question that must be established on a case by case
basis before the hypothesis can be invoked. As a general qualitative result that can be
used in thinking about incentive and real option problems in a general sense, the
monotonicity hypothesis is almost certainly false.
3. Bondholders, Deposit Insurers and Their Risk Alignment
If bond investors price their investments rationally, will we necessarily observe
that bond coupon rates (or yields) are monotonically increasing in 1) bond default risk or
2) the measures of risk of interest to bank supervisors and deposit insurers? In both cases
the answer is “No.”
In the first case bond investors care both about default and losses in the event of
default. A higher default risk can be more than compensated by a higher recovery in the
event of default resulting in a lower coupon rate. In the second case, bond investors and
deposit insurers are sensitive to different possible payoffs of the projects their funds are
invested in. Depositors, and hence deposit insurers are paid first. Once their obligations
are covered they are (theoretically) indifferent as to how much more the project pays off.
On the other hand, if the project cannot cover the depositors’ claims the bond investors
recover nothing and are therefore indifferent as to the amount of the shortfall.
The remainder of this note develops this intuition mathematically and gives
simple numerical examples. The note concludes with a brief discussion of the policy
implications of these results.12
The Basic Argument
Rational bond investors demand coupon rates that set the expected return on the
bond equal to some risk-adjusted benchmark.
9 For example if bond investors are risk
neutral the expected returns on bonds will equal the risk free rate.
10
For simplicity, assume a single period bond that promises to repay principal ($1)
plus the coupon, c (to be determined). The borrower invests in a project which repays x
with a probability density function of f(x).
The expected repayment to the bond investors consists of the principal and
coupon if the borrower’s project pays off at least that amount:
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ,
c cf x d x
∞
+ + ∫
and the expect project value itself if the project payoff is insufficient to cover the
principal and coupon, that is if the loan defaults (we will address the issue of bankruptcy








By assumption of risk-neutrality the expected payoff of the bond will be equal to
1 plus the risk free rate in equilibrium:
(1 )
(1 ) 0 1 ( 1 ) () () .
c
f c rc f x d xx f x d x
∞+
+ +=+ + ∫∫
The bond default probability, which we denote  B π  is
(1 )
(1 ) () 1 ()
c
B c f x dx f x dx π
+∞
−∞ + == − ∫∫
which allows us to rewrite the equilibrium coupon rate equation as
(1 )
0 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( ) .
c
fB rc x f x d x π
+
+=+ − + ∫ (4)
                                                
9 Covitz, Hancock and Kwast, 2000, “Mandatory Subordinated Debt: Would Banks Face More Market
Discipline?” Federal Reserve Board working paper, made the point that bondholders care about expected
return and not default probability per se and thus motivated this analysis.
10 The analysis that follows does not depend on risk-neutral bond investors, however it does simplify the
math.13
Now consider two different, but equal-sized, projects with payoff densities () fx
and 
*() fx . The resulting coupons,c and 
* c  will in equilibrium satisfy:
* (1 ) (1 ) ** *
00 1 (1 )(1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 ) ( ) .
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fB B r c xf xd x c xf xd x ππ
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Can we conclude from this bond pricing relation that 
** ? BB cc ππ >⇔ >  We can
not. The reason is that knowing both 
*
BB ππ >  and eq. (1.1) is still insufficient to
determine
* (1 ) (1 ) *
00 () ? () .
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xf xd x xf xd x
++
<> ∫∫
A higher default probability can be offset by a higher payoff in the event of default,
resulting in a lower expected return and hence a lower coupon rate (even though the
default threshold is itself a function of the coupon rate).
Example 2 illustrates this assertion. Each of the two projects to be compared has
two possible outcomes, “good” and “bad.” The projects are calibrated to have the same
expected payoffs. In this example Project A has a higher payoff variance, 7.29 vs. 4.36,
and a higher probability that the borrower will default on the bond, 10% vs. 5%.
Nonetheless, bond investors will require a lower coupon rate to lend to Project A than to
Projects B, 5.55% vs. 10.53%.
Bankruptcy Costs
Fixed bankruptcy costs have the effect of lowering the payoff in the event of
default. If bankruptcy costs are  1 bc <+  then the equilibrium coupon rate must satisfy
(1 )
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) .
c
f b rc x b f x d x π
+
+=+ −+ − ∫ (5)
Again, knowing
* ππ >  and equation (5) are insufficient to determine
* (1 ) (1 ) * () ( )? () ( ) .
cc
bb xb f x d x xb fx d x
++
−< > − ∫∫14
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coupon rate 5.55% 10.53%
•   Each project is financed with a bond that promises to repay principle, 1, plus the
coupon, c, at the end of the project.
•   Bond investors are risk neutral.
•   The equilibrium coupon rate is set so that expected bond payoff equals 1 plus the risk
free rate, 5%.
1m i n ( 1 , ) m i n ( 1 , ) fu u d d rc x c x ππ += + + +15
If bankruptcy costs are proportional,  1, b <  to the value of assets, x, then the
equilibrium coupon rate must satisfy
(1 )
0 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ,
c
f rc x b f x d x π
+
+=+ −+ − ∫
and again we cannot determine
* (1 ) (1 ) *
00 (1 ) ( ) ? (1 ) ( ) .
cc
xb f x d x xb f x d x
++
−< > − ∫∫
Thus, the existence of bankruptcy costs do not generally effect our conclusion that
there does not exist an unambiguously monotonic relation between the coupon rate that
bond investors demand in equilibrium and the probability that the bond will default.
Insurers’ Losses
Suppose bank supervisor/insurers care primarily about defaults to bondholders,
perhaps because they will incur financial or political costs from recognizing and
resolving insolvency even when the project payoff exceeds the insured-deposit
obligations.
11 Then the results in the previous section will continue to apply and coupon
rates will not increase monotonically in expected harm to supervisor/insurers.
Next consider bank supervisor/insurers who are free of non-economic
considerations such as a tendency to equate closure with supervisory failure. Let the
quantity of insured deposit obligations at the end of the period be D. Dead-weight losses
due to reorganization are ignored (following the above arguments they do not materially
change the analysis). Thus, the probability that losses will occur to the deposit fund is
() ,
D
D fx d x π
−∞ = ∫
and the expected loss to the deposit fund is
0 () ( ) .
D
D EL D x f x dx =− ∫
                                                
11 Insolvency with attendant costs is assumed to result when the bank cannot payoff all fixed claimants
including bondholders. In some cases this may not be true and regulators may prevent bondholders from
legally enforcing their claims. In such cases bonds are de facto non-voting, tax-advantage preferred stock
and not debt in the usual sense.16
The bondholders stand behind the insured depositors for pay off from the project,
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It is immediately apparent that bondholders and deposit insurers are concerned
about different portions of the project-payoff distribution. Bondholders care only about
payoffs above D, while deposit insurers care about payoffs between zero and D. It is thus
possible for equilibrium bond coupons for different projects to be ordered differently than
probability of deposit defaults or expected losses to deposit insurers. Bondholders are
willing to trade of a greater risk of being paid nothing, for a greater expected payoff when
depositors are fully covered. Example 3 illustrates this result.
Again the competing projects have been calibrated to have the same expected
payoffs. In this example the projects have the same variance as well. Even though the
projects also have the same probability of defaulting on the bonds, 10%, they nonetheless
have different equilibrium coupon rates: 9.74% for Project A vs. 10.53% for Project B.
The low-coupon-rate project A has the lower deposit-default probability, 2% vs. 3%, but
also has the higher expected loss to the deposit insurance fund, 0.020 vs. 0.015.
12
Example 4 illustrates a case where the low-bond-coupon project has the higher depositor
default rate and the higher expected losses to the deposit insurance fund.
Summary
The analysis has shown that rationally-set equilibrium bond coupon rates, and by
extension secondary-market bond yields, are not proxies for
•   Probability of bond default,
•   Probability that depositors will not be repaid in full by a bank, or
•   Expected financial losses to the deposit insurance fund,
                                                
12 This illustrates a potential inconsistency between a deposit insurer’s goals of minimizing probability of
default (on deposit repayment) and minimizing losses to the deposit insurance fund.17
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•   Each project is financed with a bond that promises to repay principle, 1, plus the
coupon, c, at the end of the project, and insured deposits of  1. D =
•   Cost of deposits and interest rate on deposits are both assumed to be zero.
•   Deposit repayment takes priority over bond repayment.
•   Bond investors are risk neutral.
•   Expected deposit insurer losses are
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in the sense that when comparing two or more bonds, a higher coupon rate does not
reliably indicate the relative magnitudes that obtain for any of these other measures of
risk.
The numerical examples were, of course, contrived to illustrate the possibilities
for inconsistency in ordering of projects depending on which risk measure or proxy is
used. However, the distributions used in these examples are by no means bizarre.
13 If one
is willing to make sufficient assumptions about project returns (e.g. normally distributed
with equal means) and capital structure (identical), then under such specific assumptions
one might be able to assert that all risk measures and proxies should be identically
ordered.
14 But the situations that guarantee consistency may well be the exception rather
than the rule. The restrictions for obtaining consistency are likely to be severe and we
usually do not know enough about real-world return distributions to be sure that the
required conditions obtain, even approximately.
15
Policy Implications
Economic arguments suggest that bank supervisor/insurers should price deposit
insurance so to cap at a socially optimal level the probability that bank-default-related
insurance-fund payments to depositors in any given period do not exceed the funds in the
deposit insurance pool. However, we observe that deposit insurance is under-priced by
any reasonable measure of bank risk and simultaneously that supervisors are extremely
reluctant to close banks that appear to be economically insolvent (forbearance). This
suggests that there are regulatory costs to bank failure that are independent of the actual
financial losses that closing the bank would occur.
                                                
13 Preliminary results of ongoing work for this paper show that the same ambiguity obtains with normally
distributed project returns.
14 The development of necessary and sufficient conditions for consistent risk ordering is beyond the scope
of this note.
15 Note in Example2 that equality of payoff means and variances together are still insufficient to guarantee
consistency. Normally distributed payoffs, without restrictions on means, are also insufficient.19
Example 4













Good:    g 0.920 4.00 0.900 4.05
Bad:      b 0.060 1.00 0.035 1.90
















•   Each project is financed with a bond that promises to repay principle, 1, plus the
coupon, c, at the end of the project, and insured deposits of  1. D =
•   Cost of deposits and interest rate on deposits are both assumed to be zero.
•   Deposit repayment takes priority over bond repayment.
•   Bond investors are risk neutral.
•   Expected deposit insurer losses are
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It has been widely suggested that reliance on the yields of mandated sub-ordinated
bonds issued by banks can circumvent non-economic incentives of supervisors by
proxying for economically-rational supervisory goals. The analysis in this note suggests
that this is not necessarily true. The trade-off of default-probability and loss-given-default
facing the bondholder is not the same as that facing the supervisor/insurer. This because
depositor-priority forces bondholders and deposit insurers to be concerned with different
parts of the project-return distribution. Thus, it is unclear that subordinated debt yields
will achieved the desired result of classifying banks in order of economically-rational
regulatory concern. Nor could a maximum-allowable bond-yield threshold reliably
discriminate with any precision between banks that pose expected deposit-insurance
losses or insolvency risk above a socially optimal threshold, and those that do not.
The basic intuition that higher bond yields signal higher risk is, of course,
generally true, even if it is not invariably true, so long as “risk” is used as an intuitive
concept rather than a measurable one and yield differences are large. However, any
attempt to define the idea of “risk” precisely, and to then link bondholder risk to deposit
insurer risk will inevitably run into the problem that bondholders and deposit insurers are
not the same and hence do not share the same risks.
4. Summary and Conclusion
This paper has shown that two commonly held conceptions regarding risk are
subject to error. That option value increases in risk is true only for limited types of
options and for restrictive types of distributions, situations that do not generally obtain.
The related idea that equity holders present a moral hazard risk because the value of their
call option on the assets of the firm may be increased by increase the riskiness of
investments, at the expense of bondholders, is flawed for related reasons.
The coincidence of fixed claimants’ assessments of risk is similarly dependent on
restrictive, and generally unverifiable, assumptions about the distributions of returns of
bank (or firm) investments. This is due to the priority of payoffs different claimants
enjoy, and due to the effects that return distributions have on the expectations of those
payoffs being realized. Not only is it quite possible for different fixed claimants to21
disagree on the relative risks they face, but the relative risks for a given claimant may
depend on whether they are interested in economic losses or the event of default itself.
Rules of thumb such as those discussed in this paper are only useful so long as
they do not mislead. That is where they are generally, if perhaps not absolutely, reliable.
The examples given here are sensitive to effects about which we know very little, for
example the true distribution of bank portfolio expected returns. That leaves the empirical
question of how important the questions raised here are in practice.
There is little evidence on the degree to which increases in bond yields parallel
increases in risk (default or economic losses) to deposit insurers. What evidence there is
is indirect at best.
16 Nonetheless, an empirical investigation of this question is, in theory,
possible. The incentives of equity holders is a more complex, and probably illusive,
question. Incentives are not easily measurable. The potential effects on firm performance
of equity holder incentives are difficult to measure, and the ability of equity holders to
influence managers is uncertain.
17 Nonetheless, theory strongly suggests that equity
holder moral hazard risk is easily overstated. Equity holders’ incentives to induce firm
risk taking are clearly offset by incentives to ensure firm survival—to avoid losing future
profits. Models that consider this issue suggest that equity holders will wish to reduce
firm risk as the firm approaches insolvency. Most models also suggest that equity holder
incentives for risk taking, betting the bank, increases sharply only when the firm becomes
economically insolvent. This likely discontinuity presents an interesting, and as yet
unresolved, problem for those interested in corporate governance or regulation.
Finally, these two examples show that while we may have an intuitive
understanding of what risk means, any attempt to pin down the concept can lead to
ambiguity. Clearly defining which (and whose) risks are being discussed is a necessary
preliminary to any meaningful analysis.
                                                
16 See Bliss(2001) for a discussion.
17 See Bliss and Flannery (2001).22
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